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 FAITH PRIMARY SCHOOLS:  
BETTER SCHOOLS OR BETTER PUPILS? 
 
 
Abstract 
We estimate the causal effect of attending a state Faith school on primary education achievement 
in England using administrative student-level data and implementing various strategies to control 
for students’ selection into Faith-schooling. Our regressions control for fixed-effects in prior 
achievement and residential postcode to compare pupils who are close residential neighbours and 
have identical observable ability. We also use information on future school choices to control for 
preferences for Faith schooling. Results show that pupils progress faster in Faith primary schools, 
but all of this advantage is explained by sorting into Faith schools according to pre-existing 
characteristics and preferences.  
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1. Introduction 
Quality of childhood schooling is increasingly seen as important for life chances, because adults’ 
success in the labour market is closely linked to early educational attainments (Carneiro et al., 2007, 
Cunha et al., 2006, Cunha and Heckman, 2008 and Heckman, 2000). However, economic and 
educational research has had little success in identifying resource-based interventions that are 
effective in raising school standards (Hanushek, 2003 and 2006). Government policy in many 
countries now favours reforms based on incentives, governance, increased choice and competition1. 
In England, this idea has become linked with the expansion of the state-funded Faith-school sector 
because it symbolises choice and diversity in the education system and embodies the kind of practice 
in governance that policy makers wish to promote, and – crucially – because it is claimed that Faith 
schools offer higher educational standards (DfES White Paper, 2005; DfES Education Bill, 2006). 
This case is, however, a difficult one to assess, because pupils that choose and get chosen by Faith 
schools differ from the population of pupils in ways that are correlated with their educational 
achievement.  
Most of the existing research into the effectiveness of Faith schools is based on US Catholic 
schools, which are all private. Therefore previous studies do not distinguish the specific effects of 
religious affiliation on academic achievement from the effects of a private education. In contrast, 
most Faith schools in England are state funded and part of the mainstream state system. This makes 
England a more attractive setting for studying the specific effects of religious affiliation. In addition, 
it makes this country an interesting framework for assessing the effectiveness of polices aimed at 
improving state-funded education through the expansion of choice and alternative institutional 
arrangements. However, there is almost no evidence for England that makes any attempts to separate 
                                                 
1
 See LeGrand (1991), Le Grand and Bartlett (1993), and Machin and Vignoles (2005) for a review of the English 
experience, and Hoxby (2004) for an analysis of US based evidence. 
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out the causal effect of attending a Faith school on educational achievement from pure sorting and 
selection.  
In this paper we present new evidence on this issue and tackle estimation of the impact of 
religious education under conditions in which the process of selection into Faith schools is uncertain 
and complex. We provide insights into whether the performance gap between Faith and Secular 
schools is driven by better schooling in the Faith sector, or by the fact that Faith schools admit 
‘better’ pupils to start with. The ultimate aim of the empirical work is to compare standard national 
test scores at age-11 for students who attended Faith primary schools with near-identical students in 
the Secular (non-Faith) primary sector. To do so, we use data from an administrative census of 
primary school pupils in England which contains longitudinal detail on their tests at various ages, 
history of schools attended, and places of residence. 
Previous (mainly US) research has made use of instruments for Faith school attendance such as 
family religion, neighbours’ religion and other characteristics of place of residence. However, we 
agree with claims that these instruments are not credible when the point of the exercise is to purge 
estimates of family background and ability-related effects (Altonji et al. 2005a, 2005b). We argue 
that these instruments are generally inappropriate, because family religion is correlated with other 
background characteristics, and because families choose where to live for reasons often related to the 
school they wish their children to attend. In our context there are no credible instruments for Faith 
school attendance and it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about a unique parameter capturing the 
average causal effect of religious schooling. Instead, we use a variety of empirical strategies to bound 
the magnitude of the causal effect of attending a Faith primary school on educational attainment at 
the end of primary schooling (age 11). These strategies are based on our knowledge of the 
institutional and admissions arrangements in English schools.  
To assist in reading the paper, we present next a brief ‘road map’ of the methods and results, 
which proceed in the following sequential fashion: 
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(a) We first exploit the sheer size and high level of detail in our dataset to control for prior, age-
7 achievement and family background using prior subject-by-achievement-level fixed-effects 
and home-postcode fixed-effects (plus other control variables). 
(b) We next take advantage of the fact that selection into Faith schooling occurs twice, once at 
the primary phase and again at the secondary phase. We therefore go on to include secondary-
type-by-postcode fixed-effects (where ‘type’ is Faith or Secular schooling) or secondary-school-
by-postcode fixed-effects in our regressions. This will be an effective strategy if there is 
comparable selection into both primary and secondary Faith schooling based solely on 
advantageous pupil and family background characteristics. By this method, we mitigate as much 
as possible the influence of confounding unobservables on pupil attainment at age 11. When we 
follow this route, we find only a small advantage from Faith primary schooling, worth about 1 
percentile on age-11 test scores. 
(c) However, controlling for secondary-school or secondary-school-type fixed-effects is 
problematic if there is selection into Faith secondary schooling according to Faith primary 
attendance, or on the academic outputs of primary schooling, in conjunction with selection on 
unobserved pupil and family background characteristics. Therefore, we go on to present a 
bounding exercise in which we estimate the Faith-primary school effect in two pupil sub-groups, 
namely: (i) the stayers, who attend the same school type in both the primary and secondary 
phases; and (ii) the switchers, who attend different school types in each of these phases. For the 
stayers, we compare the primary school achievements of pupils who attend both a Faith primary 
and Faith secondary with the primary school achievements of those who attend a Secular school 
in both phases. In the switchers’ case, we compare the primary school achievements of students 
who attend a Faith primary school but a Secular secondary, with the primary school 
achievements of pupils who attend a Secular primary and Faith secondary school. Under the 
assumption that there is positive selection into Faith-secondary schools based on pupil and 
family background, there will be more positive sorting into Faith-primary schools in the sample 
of stayers than in the sample of switchers. Thus regression estimates based on stayers provide an 
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upper bound to the Faith-primary school effect, whilst regression estimates based on switchers 
provide a lower bound or a close-to-unbiased estimate of the causal effect of Faith primary 
schooling. Following the reasoning in Altonji et al. (2005b) – who suggest that the amount of 
selection on observables provides guidance on the amount of selection on unobservables – we 
assess the credibility of these arguments by looking at the degree of sorting on observable 
characteristics for these two sub-groups. We find that Faith-sector stayers have very different 
observable characteristics from Secular-sector stayers, whereas switchers exhibit much less 
observable sorting into Faith-primary schooling. In parallel, we find that Faith school stayers 
have an age-11 test score advantage of up to 2.7 percentiles, while Faith school switchers 
experience zero or negative gains. In practice, estimates based on switchers are likely to be a 
much better guide to the causal effects of primary Faith schooling than the estimates based on 
stayers, given that sorting into Faith primary schooling is much lower in the switchers’ group. 
(d) To formalize these intuitions, we conclude our analysis using the method developed in 
Altonji et al. (2005b) to explicitly assess the robustness of our findings to varying degrees of 
selection on unobservables. Our findings suggest that with moderate degrees of selection on 
unobservables the estimated advantage of attending a Faith school vanishes. More importantly, 
we find that when we constrain the amount of selection on unbservables to equal the amount of 
selection on observables, our estimates become zero or negative-insignificant. This is true for 
pupils in our full sample, as well as for the subgroups of stayers and switchers. In a nutshell, our 
results suggest that all of the advantage of Faith schooling can be explained by differences 
between pupils who attend Faith schools and those who do not. 
The rest of paper has the following structure. The next section critically reviews the literature on 
the topic and its methods. Section 3 explains the different types of schools that exist in England and 
the data that we use. Section 4 sets out our empirical methods in more detail, and Section 5 discusses 
the results that arise from these approaches. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. A review of the methods used in previous studies 
Evidence on the academic impact of Faith schools in England is limited and based on shaky 
foundations. Schagen et al. (2002) show that pupils in Faith secondary schools progress faster in 
English (but not in Maths and Science), and also seem to pass more subjects overall in their age-16 
exams. Benton et al. (2003) report that pupils in schools affiliated with non-mainstream Christian 
(i.e. not Catholic or Church of England) and Jewish denominations show faster progress between age 
11 and 16. Finally, in a study of two London boroughs with only 7 religious schools, Prais (2005) 
finds quite strong Faith school advantages in Maths, particularly amongst weakest pupils. However, 
none of these studies takes any steps to control for pupil background or otherwise deal with selection 
on unobservable characteristics that influence educational progress. 
In contrast, a fairly large literature on the topic has emerged in the US and has focussed on 
private Catholic schools – largely springing from the influential work of Coleman (1982)2. Overall, 
this research finds that attendance at a Catholic school raises students’ graduation rates and test 
scores, though there is variation across different demographic and geographical groups, and across 
subject areas. The following discussion will focus on whether there is anything we can learn from the 
methodological approaches used in the US and international literature, rather than the results per-se. 
As noted above, an important difference between the US and England is that Faith schools in the US 
– mainly Catholic – are private-sector schools whereas Faith schools in England – mainly Catholic 
and Church of England – are part of the state-school system. Nevertheless, we face the same 
empirical issue as US researchers, namely that there is non-random sorting of pupils into Faith 
schools, such that religious school attendance is correlated with educationally-advantageous pupil 
and family characteristics. Therefore, researchers interested in the causal effect of religious education 
have to look for a source of random variation in the probability of Faith school attendance that can be 
used as an instrument. Disappointingly, many of the instrument choices do not seem credible, and the 
                                                 
2
 See Dronkers (2004) for a review of the European evidence on educational and behavioural effects of attending a Faith 
school, and a detailed analysis of the historical and institutional determinants of religious education in Europe. 
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evidence in Altonji et al. (2005a) and (2005b) is not supportive of any of those that are commonly 
used. 
One commonly used instrument is family religion, because being Catholic is a strong 
determinant of attendance at a Catholic school (see Noell, 1982, Evans and Schwab, 1995 and in part 
of Neal, 1997). However, a priori, it is hard to believe that ‘religiosity’ is randomly assigned so that 
it does not correlate with unobservables that affect family attitudes towards education, school 
achievements and economic outcomes. In fact, recent studies show that a wide range of outcomes are 
correlated with religiosity, including income, disability, marriage, divorce (Gruber, 2005), economic 
growth (Weber, 1905, Barro and McCleary, 2003), and attitudes that are conducive to positive 
economic outcomes (Guiso et al., 2003). On balance, we are not convinced that family religion is a 
useful instrument for Faith school attendance.  
Other instruments exploit information on the local ‘supply’ of Faith schooling based on the 
geographical density of Catholic schools (Neal, 1997, Figlio and Stone, 1999, Grogger and Neal, 
2000). We find this idea unconvincing theoretically. Families surely decide to live near Catholic 
schools in part because they want their children to go to Catholic schools. In fact, a lot of existing 
evidence highlights the role of schools in housing choices (Black, 1999, Gibbons and Machin, 2006, 
Kain, Staiger and Reigg, 2005). Therefore, instrumenting religious school attendance with distance 
to/density of Catholic schools is unlikely to fix problems related to the endogeneity of Catholic 
school choice. For similar reasons, local demographic characteristics, such as the proportion of 
Catholics in the neighbourhood, are inappropriate instruments if families have made the choice to 
live in this type of community. Others have tried to use interactions of these variables as instruments, 
whilst controlling for their levels (e.g. Sander, 1996), but the testing in Altonji et al. (2005a) suggests 
this approach is not fully satisfactory. 
In short, our argument is that previous research has neglected the problem of sorting induced by 
residential choice, which implies that many geographical variables are inappropriate instruments for 
school choice. To evaluate our critique, we partly replicated this type of empirical strategy on our 
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English data (described later) using instruments similar to those in Neal (1997).3 Although the 
instruments are powerful in the first-stage equation, they are also significantly related to a variety of 
neighbourhood characteristics, including local average house prices, local unemployment rates and 
the fraction of adults with higher levels of education in the local population. Additionally, the IV 
coefficients are always above OLS estimates implying strong negative selection into Faith schools 
such that pupils with educationally disadvantageous characteristics choose Faith schooling. This 
negative sorting is implausible in the English school system, as we show later. In conclusion, these 
instruments are likely to be invalid and simply magnify the effect of unobservable parental 
preferences and school-side selection in our context. 
Given the weaknesses in the IV approach, other researchers have tried alternative methods. 
Jepsen (2003) uses value-added models to control for pupil background characteristics and finds no 
impact of Catholic schools on test scores. In a different approach, Altonji et al. (2005a) and (2005b) 
infer the degree of selection bias in the Catholic school effect from the extent of selection on 
observable pupil characteristics, and conclude that whilst there is an impact on high school and 
college graduation rates, there is no influence on test scores. Our approach is closer to these more 
recent US studies, but we have the advantage of a dataset on the population of students in England, 
containing information on pupil’s prior attainments, demographics and details on precise 
geographical location. Before discussing our methods, we outline the institutional context for Faith 
schooling in England, and the details of the dataset we will use. 
3. Institutional context and data 
3.1. School governance 
Primary schools in the state-sector in England fall into four categories that differ in terms of 
governance, ownership of the school buildings, employment of teaching staff and control over pupil 
                                                 
3
 Results are not tabulated for space reasons. However, a selection of our findings and some further discussions are 
presented in the on-line appendix. 
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admissions4. The key differences between these school types – Community, Foundation, Voluntary 
Aided and Voluntary Controlled – are set out in Table 1. The most relevant distinctions for our 
analysis relate to the composition of the governing board and to pupil admissions. 
State schools receive nearly all their funding from central government, through Local 
Authorities (LAs) that are responsible for schools in their geographical domain. Schools, other than 
Community schools, are linked to a Faith or other local charitable organisation. All schools are run 
by a Governing Body composed of members elected from amongst parents and staff (Parent 
Governors and Staff Governors), appointed by the LA (Representative Governors), appointed by the 
Faith or charitable organization that owns the school premises (Foundation/Partnership Governors), 
and appointed from the community (e.g. local businesses) by the Governing Body. The Governing 
Body sets the strategic direction of the school, draws up school policies, sets targets and monitors 
performance, although the day-to-day running is down to the head-teacher and his or her leadership 
team. The constitution of the Governing Body is important because it determines how much 
influence various ‘stakeholders’ have in the way the school is run – in particular, the balance of 
influence by the LA and by the Faith or charitable foundation/partnership. 
3.2. Pupil admissions  
In principle, admission to schools is based on parental preference, but in practice demand often 
outstrips the supply of places in popular schools and places are rationed on the basis of various 
school-specific oversubscription criteria. For the period covered by this research, these criteria 
conformed to a central government Code of Practice on Admissions (and today, these criteria are 
regulated by law). According to these rules, primary schools should not select by aptitude. Instead, 
for Faith-based schools, one of the overriding considerations for admission is typically attendance at 
a local church or a recommendation from a local minister. For Secular schools, the distance between 
                                                 
4
 In addition there is a small private, fee-paying sector, which we do not consider here. This educates around 6-7% of 
pupils in England as a whole (even though they tend to be over-represented at the leading universities in the UK). 
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a child’s home and school is one of the key considerations. Because of these criteria and the 
constraints of travel costs, residential choice and school choice decisions are very closely linked. 
Even so, most households can choose between two or more schools from where they live, and have a 
choice between a Secular and Faith school. 
An important distinction relevant to our study is that Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools 
are responsible for their own pupil admissions and hence have more flexibility in deciding which 
pupils will be enrolled when the school is oversubscribed. In fact, during the period under analysis, 
some Faith schools and other schools that we class as ‘autonomous’ (see Section 3.1 below), were 
allowed to interview or otherwise screen families – ostensibly to determine their religious or other 
ethical convictions. However, it has long been suspected that this resulted in covert selection based 
on parental and pupil characteristics that are correlated with pupil ability5. In other school types, the 
LA is the admissions authority, which will apply much more mechanical rules when deciding which 
pupils go to which schools. 
3.3. School classifications in our empirical work  
Given our emphasis on religious education and the heterogeneity in terms of governance and 
admissions arrangements, we re-arrange schools into four categories. The breakdown is as follows: 
• Secular-non-autonomous: includes schools that have no religious affiliation and are 
Community or Voluntary Controlled. 
• Secular-autonomous: includes schools that have no religious affiliation but are 
Foundation or Voluntary Aided. 
• Faith-non-autonomous: includes schools that have a religious affiliation and are 
Voluntary Controlled. 
                                                 
5
 West (2005) and West and Hind (2003) present detailed qualitative evidence on this issue, while Allen (2007) provides 
some statistical analysis. Even recent news investigations have reported that Faith schools implicitly make admissions 
conditional on ‘voluntary’ church donations (The Times, 2008) 
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• Faith-autonomous: includes schools that have a religious affiliation and which are 
Foundation or Voluntary Aided. 
Note that the aim of this breakdown is twofold. On the one hand, we want to highlight the 
religious affiliation of some state-sector schools in England. On the other hand, we want to 
emphasize the fact that some religious school, as well as some Secular schools, have more 
independent governance structure and control over their admissions. These ‘autonomous’ 
arrangements might: (i) affect the way in which schools admit pupils; and (ii) affect the way in which 
the ‘ethos’ of the religious (or other) charity influences their daily functioning and strategic 
leadership. Our empirical work will explore differences in achievements of pupils in these schools, 
and consider to what extent these are caused by their religious character, as opposed to their 
autonomous arrangements6. First, however, we explain the way attainment is assessed in English 
primary schools, and describe the data we will use. 
3.4. National curriculum and assessment 
Compulsory education in England is organised into five stages referred to as Key Stages. In the 
primary phase, pupils enter school at age 4-5 in the Foundation Stage and then move on to Key Stage 
1 (ks1), spanning ages 5-6 and 6-7. At age 7-8 pupils move to Keys Stage 2 (ks2), sometimes – but 
not usually – with a change of school7. At the end of ks2, when they are 10-11, children leave the 
primary phase and go on to secondary school where they progress through Key Stages 3 and 4. At 
the end of each Key Stage, pupils are assessed on the basis of standard national tests, and progress 
                                                 
6
 Almost all Faith schools in England are either Church of England or Catholic schools. Only a minority of schools 
(enrolling less than 1% of pupils) is associated with other Faiths (e.g. Jewish or Muslim). Catholic schools account for 
53% of the Faith-autonomous sector, while nearly all schools in the Faith-non-autonomous sector are affiliated to the 
Church of England. In earlier versions of this work, we studied whether there is any heterogeneity in our conclusions 
along the dimensions of different religious affiliation, but failed to find any. Results are available from the authors. 
7
 In few cases there are separate Infants and Junior schools (covering Key Stage 1 and 2 respectively) and a few LAs 
operate a Middle School system (bridging the primary and secondary phases). We do not consider these schools here. 
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through the phases is measured in terms of Key Stage Levels. A point system is applied to convert 
these levels into scores that represent about one term’s (10-12 weeks) progress. 
3.5. The data 
The UK’s Department for Children, Families and Schools (DCSF) collects various data on school 
and pupils for funding and administrative purposes and to compile school performance tables. This 
National Pupil Database (NPD) holds information on each pupil’s assessment record in the Key 
Stage tests throughout their school career. Since 2002, the data also includes information on pupils’ 
school, gender, age, ethnicity, language skills, special educational needs or disabilities, entitlement to 
free school meals and other characteristics. Importantly, the data also includes home-postcode, which 
typically encompasses 15 contiguous housing units, allowing us to control very carefully for 
residential location. The NPD therefore provides us with a uniquely large and detailed dataset on 
pupil characteristics and their test histories with details on the Levels reached in Maths, English and 
Science (although Science is not tested at ks1 so we do not make use of it). Additionally, for ks2 and 
beyond, the data also contain raw scores in the various component tests.  
In our analysis, we use information on two cohorts: those aged 10-11 and sitting their ks2 tests 
in 2002 and 2003, who took their ks1 tests in 1998 and 1999 respectively. We can further observe 
which school these pupils go to when they move on to secondary school in 2003 and 2004. Various 
other data sources can also be merged in at school level – in particular each school’s religious 
affiliation and the institutional types described above in Section 3.1. We will use this large and 
complex combined data set – which gives us information on around 1 million pupils in over 14,000 
primary schools in England – to estimate the influence of Faith schools on pupil achievement at the 
end of ks2 (age 11), conditional on achievement at ks1 (age 7). In the next section we set out the 
empirical strategy more precisely. 
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4. Empirical Model and Strategy 
4.1. Basic model 
As discussed above (see Section 2 and 3.2), Faith school choice is potentially endogenous to pupil 
achievement. Firstly, families with a preference for religious schools may have characteristics that 
directly influence academic progress in their children. This pupil-side ‘selection’ (sorting) into Faith 
schooling is the main threat to the identification of the causal effect of Faith schooling relative to 
Secular schooling. Secondly, in the English context, Faith schools at both primary and secondary 
level have much greater control over their own pupil admissions than do Secular schools. Hence, 
admission to a Faith school may be partly determined by educationally relevant attributes that 
schools can observe – but which we cannot – which adds to the identification problems8. As outlined 
in Section 2, we do not believe there are any credible instruments that would solve this identification 
problem. Nevertheless, we do have a wealth of information on pupil characteristics, records of 
achievement, residential location and history of school attendance which can be used to bound the 
estimates of the effect of attending a Faith primary school.  
The basic model that we estimate is a standard pupil-level value-added model of achievement, 
which measures the association of various pupil and school characteristics with test scores at ks2, 
conditional on test scores at ks1. In our two-period empirical setup, the subscript 2 denotes the Key 
Stage 2 phase, and achievement of pupil i  in Maths and English at ks2 ( 2iks ) builds on prior 
attainment in these subjects at ks1 ( 1iks ), and is modified by school-type factors ( 2jβ , a school effect 
that is identical for different pupils in school type j  at Key Stage 2), observable personal/family 
                                                 
8
 In the US private Catholic school setting, these factors are theoretically related to the benefits of choosing a Faith 
school, since attendance at a private school rather than a pubic school imposes financial costs. In England, conditional on 
place of residence, admission to a state Faith school does not incur high additional costs relative to a non-Faith school. 
The only likely cost is the effort of demonstrating some religious commitment through church attendance. 
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characteristics ( ix′ , mainly ethnicity, free meal entitlement, gender, language) and unobserved 
pupil/family characteristics ( iη , with 0)( =iE η ): 
2 2 1 2( )i j i i i iks x g ksβ γ η ε′= + + + +         (1) 
Note that ix′ , itks  and 2iε  (other unobservables) all include school and school-type specific 
components, but for simplicity we suppress any school or school-type subscripts on these variables. 
The parameter of interest is 2jβ , i.e. the primary school-type effect for the various school types 
discussed in Section 3.3. The essential empirical problem is that family-side selection of schools and 
school-side selection of pupils before ks2 imply that primary school choice is endogenous to the 
unobserved pupil/family characteristics iη : the unobservables that influence the rate of progress 
during ks2 also influence school choice probabilities, so that 1( | , , ) 0i i iE ks x j kη = ≠ . Estimates of 
2jβ  that do not control for [ ]|iE jη  are biased estimates of the expected impact of Faith school 
attendance. 
4.2. Prior achievement and home-postcode fixed-effects 
Most previous research on Faith school effects had to make-do without information on prior 
achievement. In contrast, we can control for prior achievements in a highly flexible fashion by 
adding to our specifications a large number of fixed-effects (183 dummies) for combinations of the 
levels in Reading, Writing and Maths in ks1 tests. Even so, conditioning on prior test scores and 
observable pupil characteristics is most likely an incomplete way of controlling for pupil selection 
into different school types (see Manning and Pischke, 2006). So we must take further steps to control 
for sorting into Faith schooling. 
Previous literature has used geography-based instruments to deal with the problem of selection 
on unobservables into Faith schooling. However, basic theories of urban economics suggest that 
households with different incomes and preferences sort into communities according to the benefit 
they can derive from local amenities and the income available to pay for housing or taxes (Tiebout, 
1956). Given that residential choice and school choice decisions are closely linked, we believe it 
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must be preferable to use place of residence to control for the endogeneity (via iη ) of school choice, 
rather than use it as an instrument. Our data is ideal for this purpose, because the geographical detail 
and density of pupils means we can identify groups of pupils who live in the same postcode 
(typically 15 contiguous housing units), but attend different schools. We therefore include home-
postcode fixed-effects in our models to partially condition out iη , i.e. unobservable family income, 
background and preferences-related factors that are linked to residential choice. 
4.3. Secondary school-type and school fixed-effects 
Controlling for place of residence will still not be enough to eliminate selection into Faith schooling 
on the basis of unobservable factors in (1) if Faith school attendance is linked to different preferences 
or unobserved attributes even amongst pupils living in the same postcode. To tackle this issue, we 
take advantage of the fact the selection into Faith schools occurs twice – once at primary and once at 
secondary school – and assume that choice of secondary school conveys information about selection 
at the primary stage, including family preferences for Faith schooling and school preferences for 
different types of family. In practise, the same types of school found at the primary phase (Table 1) 
are also found in the secondary phase, and we exploit this fact to control for components of iη  that 
jointly influence primary and secondary school choices. We implement this idea by adding 
secondary-school-type × home-postcode fixed-effects or secondary-school × home-postcode fixed-
effects to our value-added model of equation (1)9. Identification comes from the comparison of 
pupils who attend a different primary school type, but are otherwise ‘matched’ in the sense that they 
live in the same postcode and attend the same secondary school/type. Put simply, our argument is 
                                                 
9
 The use future information to control for unobservables is similar to Grogger (1995) on the effects of arrest on labour 
market outcomes. The author compares the pre-1984 earnings of a sample of individual arrested in 1984 or earlier – the 
‘treated’ group – to the pre-1984 earnings of a sample of individuals whose first arrest occurred after 1984 – the ‘control’ 
group. 
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that pupils from Secular-primary schools are likely to be better comparators for pupils from Faith-
primary schools when they are in the same secondary school/type.10 
Under plausible assumptions, estimates of the Faith-primary effect that control for secondary-
school/type will be less biased than those that only control for prior achievement and home-postcode 
fixed-effects (plus other controls). Specifically, these assumptions are that: (i) selection into primary 
and secondary school depends on the same unobservable pupil/family attributes iη , and selection on 
iη  operates in the same direction at both phases; and (ii) other unobservable factors that determine 
Faith-school attendance at either primary or secondary phase are uncorrelated with iη , or otherwise 
with ks2 achievement (conditional on observable pupil attributes). 
However, controlling for secondary school/type will not reduce the bias in our estimates of 2jβ  
if there is only weak correlation between the unobservables that influence Faith-primary attendance 
and the assignment to secondary school. In this case, secondary school choice conveys no 
information about selection into primary schools.  
More importantly, there are scenarios where controlling for secondary school/type fixed-effects 
could make our estimates more biased than they would be without these controls. These arise when 
there is differential selection at the secondary level between pupils coming from Faith primary and 
those coming from Secular primary schools, and this differential selection is strong relative to 
selection into Faith primary schooling. One such case occurs when there is positive selection on 
unobservables iη  into Faith-secondary schools, but Faith-secondary schools prefer pupils coming 
from Faith-primary schools (i.e. they set a lower threshold for iη ), conditional on all other 
characteristics. A second possibility is that Faith-primary schools tend to raise student achievement, 
                                                 
10
 Note that controlling for secondary-school fixed-effects might be problematic because of what Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) call the ‘bad controls’ problem (pp. 64-68). For example, if faith primary schooling is not endogenous in the first 
place, then controlling for a characteristic (secondary schooling) that is potentially determined by faith primary schooling 
and correlated with achievements will make the bias worse than if the control had not been included. See further 
discussions in the body text and Appendix A for details. 
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and Faith-secondary schools screen pupils on the basis of value-added (i.e. pupil ks2 scores, 
conditional on background and ks1 scores). Both these cases involve negative selection of Faith-
primary pupils by iη  within secondary schools and secondary school types. This negative selection 
occurs because only the highest- iη  pupils from Secular primary schools are selected into Faith 
secondary schools, whilst middle-to-high- iη  pupils from Faith primary schools are selected into 
Faith secondary schools. At the same time, the lowest- iη  pupils from Faith secondary schools are 
selected into Secular secondary schools, whilst the low-to-middle- iη  pupils from Secular primary 
schools end up in Secular secondary schools. As a consequence, Secular-primary pupils could be bad 
comparators for Faith-primary pupils in the same secondary school/type leading to a downward bias 
in the estimate of the effect of attending a Faith primary school.  
Note however, that this is the case only if selection into Faith primary schools is relatively weak. 
On the other hand, if there is strong positive selection into Faith primary schooling – as we claim – 
this potential differential selection into Faith secondary schools that favours Faith primary pupils 
tends to work in our favour, and including secondary school/type fixed-effects reduces the bias. This 
is because the low- iη  pupils from Faith primary schools who are forced out into the state secondary 
sector are better comparators for the low-to-middle- iη  pupils from the distribution in the Secular 
primary sector. Similarly the high- iη  pupils drawn into the Faith sector from Secular primary schools 
will be better compartors for the middle-high- iη  pupils from Faith primary schools who stay in the 
Faith sector (more details are provided in Appendix A). 
In conclusion, the institutional arrangements in England mean that models with secondary 
school/type fixed-effects are likely to improve on OLS or specifications with postcode of residence 
fixed-effects. This is so for a number of reasons. Firstly, casual observation and the results we 
present later indicate that there is strong positive selection into Faith schooling at both phases, and 
that the main determinants of Faith school attendance at both education phases are persistent aspects 
of family background and preference. Indeed, one of the main criteria for admission into Faith 
 17 
schools is some demonstration of religious commitment, which is unlikely to change between 
primary and secondary phases. Similarly, it is unlikely that there is any differential selection at the 
secondary phase by primary school-type of origin, because secondary schools do not screen either on 
primary school attendance or on ks2 achievements. In fact, neither primary nor secondary schools 
have any reliable measure of pupils’ prior academic progress at the time when they admit them. 
Primary schools admit pupils before any testing has taken place, whereas pupils apply to and receive 
admission offers from secondary schools before they have taken their ks2 tests. In addition, formal 
links between primary and secondary schools are rare in England. Finally, West (2005) and West and 
Hind (2003), report that the vast majority of (covertly) selective schools screened their pupils on the 
basis of background criteria such as: children of employees; children of former pupils; children with 
family connections to the school; children with specific talents in music, dance or arts. The authors 
do not report any evidence of selection based on general academic progress during primary 
education, or on the type of primary school attended. 
4.4. Bounding the effects using switchers and stayers 
The possibility of differential selection into secondary schools according to Faith primary status 
leads us to devise a bounding exercise that exploits the movements in and out of Faith schooling at 
the transition between primary and secondary phases. To implement this exercise, we estimate the 
primary school-type effects 2jβ  in two pupil sub-groups, namely: (i) the stayers, who attend the 
same school type in both the primary and secondary phases; and (ii) the switchers, who attend 
different school types in each of these phases. As we illustrate in Appendix A, regression estimates 
based on the comparison of Faith-primary-Faith-secondary stayers with Secular-primary-Secular-
secondary stayers provide an upper bound to the impact of Faith-primary schools on achievement. In 
contrast, estimates based on the comparison of Faith-primary-Secular-secondary switchers with 
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Secular-primary-Faith-secondary switchers provide a lower bound.11 These claims hold true if: (i) 
there is positive selection into Faith-secondary schools on the basis of pupil/family background iη ; 
and (ii) Faith secondary schools do not discriminate in favour of Secular primary pupils, i.e. Faith 
secondary schools either do not discriminate on the basis of the primary school-type, or they are 
more likely to admit Faith primary pupils than Secular primary ones, conditional on iη . 
The explanation for these claims about the bounds provided by the stayers and switchers is as 
follows. Suppose that Faith secondary schools admit Faith primary school pupils whose iη  falls 
above some threshold τ , whereas they only admit Secular primary pupils above a higher threshold 
τ ′ . The distribution of iη  amongst Secular-primary-Secular-secondary pupils is right truncated at τ ′ , 
whereas the distribution of iη  amongst Faith-primary-Faith-secondary pupils is left truncated at 
τ τ ′< . The difference in mean iη  between Faith-primary-Faith-secondary pupils and Secular-
primary-Secular-secondary pupils in these truncated distributions is therefore necessarily greater than 
the difference in means between the un-truncated distributions of Faith-primary and Secular-primary 
pupils. As a consequence, the stayers’ comparison provides an upward biased estimate of the effect 
of Faith schooling. In contrast, the distribution of iη  amongst Secular-primary-Faith-secondary 
switchers is left truncated at τ ′ , whereas the distribution of iη  for Faith-primary-Secular-secondary 
pupils is right truncated at τ . Thus, the difference in mean iη  between Faith-primary-Secular-
secondary pupils and Secular-primary-Faith-secondary pupils in these truncated distributions is 
necessarily negative (even if τ τ ′= ), so that the switchers’ comparison provides a downward biased 
estimate of the effect of Faith schooling. 
Before moving on, two further cases are worth discussing. Firstly, if switching in and out of 
Faith schooling during the primary-to-secondary transition is random (conditional on iη ), then the 
comparison of Faith-primary-Secular-secondary pupils with Secular-primary-Faith-secondary pupils 
                                                 
11
 In practise, when applying this method, we have four school types (two Faith and two Secular), but label as stayers 
pupils who stay in the same school type in both phases, and as switchers those moving between any of these four types. 
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provides an unbiased estimate of the causal Faith-primary effect on achievement. This is because in 
this case switchers-in and switchers-out of Faith schooling are likely to be well matched in terms of 
unobservable characteristics that are relevant to primary school achievements, since they are simply 
‘marginal participants’ in Faith education. As detailed in Section 4.3, we argue that this is the most 
likely scenario: Faith-school selection is based mainly on persistent pupil/family background 
characteristics iη , but for ‘marginal participants’ the decision to exit or enter Faith schooling on 
transition from primary to secondary school is more likely to be related to the quality of local 
secondary schools or to changes in family circumstances, neither of which affects ks2 achievements. 
In our empirical evidence below, we will back up this claim by showing that switchers exhibit much 
less sorting into Faith-primary schooling by observable characteristics than do pupils in the whole 
population or in the stayers’ group. Secondly, families might choose secondary school type taking 
into account the ‘quality of the match’ between the child and the sector in the primary stage as 
represented by 2iε  in equation (1), with a low realisation of 2iε  inducing families to switch school 
types. The rationale for doing so is not self-evident because families cannot observe the 
counterfactual match in the sector they did not attend, and the transition from primary to secondary 
school involves leaving the school that disappointed them in any case. Nevertheless, even under this 
scenario, the stayers’ comparison provides an upper bound to the causal effect of Faith primary 
schooling, whereas the switchers’ analysis yields estimates that are always less biased than in the full 
population of pupils and – under the most plausible assumptions – close to unbiased. Full details are 
provided in Appendix A. 
In conclusion, it is useful to summarise our arguments about estimating the causal effect of 
Faith-primary schooling using either specifications that include secondary school/type fixed-effects, 
or exploiting the switchers’ and the stayers’ comparisons. We have argued that: 
(a) Secondary school/type fixed-effects reduce the bias in our estimates if there is no 
differential selection by family/pupil background ( iη ) into Faith secondary schools according to 
Faith primary status; or if any differential selection by family/pupil background into Faith 
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secondary schools according to Faith primary status is weak relative to selection by family/pupil 
background into Faith primary schools. 
(b) Under all plausible scenarios, the stayers’ comparison provides an upper bound, and the 
switchers’ comparison either a lower bound or a close-to-unbiased estimate of the parameter of 
interest. This is so unless Faith secondary schools discriminate against Faith primaries and/or 
considerations about ‘quality of the match’ at primary school ( 2iε ) are paramount when 
choosing secondary school type, which we believe is very unlikely. 
(c) Under the conditions which we believe prevail in England, results based on the sample of 
switchers yield close-to-unbiased estimates of 2jβ . 
Although we cannot directly test these conjectures relating to unobservable selection, we draw 
on Altonji et al. (2005b) who suggest that it is likely that the amount of selection on unobservables 
‘tracks’ the amount of selection on observables. Therefore the degree of selection on unobservable 
characteristics iη  across pupil sub-groups can be explored by looking at the degree of selection on 
observable characteristics 1iks  and ix′ . In practice, this means that we study how the estimates 2ˆ jβ  
change as we move from the whole population of pupils to the subgroups of stayers and switchers, 
and that we compare these changes with the degree of sorting on observable characteristics 1[ | ]iE ks j  
and 2[ | ]iE x j  as we move across the groups. By this method, we can gauge the extent to which 
differences in 2ˆ jβ  in these sub-samples might arise through differences in selection on unobservable 
factors [ | ]iE jη . 
4.5. Calibrating selection on unobservables to selection on observables 
To formalize these intuitions, we conclude our analysis using the methods in Altonji et al. (2005b) to 
explicitly assess the robustness of our estimates to varying degrees of selection on unobservables. In 
particular, we investigate: (i) how much positive selection on unobservables we need in order to 
drive our estimates of the Faith primary effect to zero; and (ii) how robust our estimates are to the 
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assumption that there is an equal amount of selection on observables and unobservables. Once again, 
this exercise is carried out for all pupils in the sample, as well as separately for switchers and stayers.  
The results from this investigation will serve two purposes. First, we will use them to show that 
the estimated Faith-primary advantage vanishes when we constrain the amount of selection on 
observables to equal the amount of selection on observables. Secondly, we will use this method to 
directly validate our intuition that Faith school stayers are more positively sorted into religious 
schools in terms of both their observables and unobservables, than switchers. This will further lend 
support to our claims that estimates of the effect of attending a Faith primary school for switchers 
and stayers help us bound the causal impact of religious education, and that estimates based on the 
sample of switchers are closer to what the ‘true’ causal impact of Faith schooling would be in the 
absence of sorting and selection. Full details of our implementation of the Altonji et al. (2005b) 
methodology are provided in Appendix B.  
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The basic facts about the association of pupil ks2 attainments and the type of primary school attended 
are summarised in Table 2. The school categories were explained in Section 3 above. The table 
shows the means and standard deviations of pupil ks2 test scores, where the raw test scores are 
converted into percentiles. Notice that in all the empirical analysis that follows we will work with the 
average of one pupil’s percentile in the Maths and English distribution because we found no 
interesting differences between these two subjects. Summary statistics are shown in Row 1 for the 
whole sample, and then split by broad school type. The figures show the key feature that we wish to 
analyse: pupils emerging from primary schools that are classified as Faith schools under our 
definitions have higher levels of attainment than those emerging from Secular schools. The 
difference is about 4.75 percentiles in the pupil test score distribution. 
Splitting this gap into the finer school classifications defined above, we see that the apparent 
Faith-primary effect in Row 2 is more specifically associated with Faith schools that we classify as 
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autonomous. Secular schools with comparable institutional arrangements similarly show higher 
average test scores than other Secular-non-autonomous schools. Next we consider to what extent 
these higher scores are attributable to differences in the characteristics between pupils who enter 
these schools and those who do not. 
5.2. Regression estimates of sorting on pupil background and ks1 scores 
Firstly, we show that there are important and significant differences between school types in terms of 
the observable characteristics of pupils at the beginning of the Key Stage 2, i.e. the age 7-11 phase. 
Table 3, Row 1 reports overall means and standard deviations of ks1 attainment and background 
characteristics. Table 3, Rows 2-5 report results from regressions of these characteristics on school-
type dummies (with Secular-non-autonomous schools as the baseline). The pupil characteristics 
included in our analysis are: ks1 level points (here averaged across Reading, Writing and Maths); 
eligibility for free school meals; special educational need status (SEN); White ethnic origin; and 
English as a first language.  
It is evident from this table that autonomous types of schools (Faith and Secular) are at an 
advantage over standard non-autonomous Secular primary schools, both in terms of ks1 achievement 
and background characteristics usually associated with educational disadvantage. Pupils start off in 
autonomous schools in Key Stage 2 with ks1 test scores that are, on average, 1.2 to 1.7 Level points 
(1 Level point is equivalent to one term) ahead of their counterparts in Secular-non-autonomous 
schools. This is around 15% of one standard deviation and about the same as the advantage in terms 
of final scores at age-11 reported in Table 2. Certainly, this difference in ks1 between pupils in 
different school types may partly emerge because some pupils have already gained or lost out from 
the time spent in their respective primary schools. However, pupils in Faith-autonomous schools are 
also much less likely to be on a low income that entitles them to free school meals, more likely to be 
White and more likely to have English as their first language. The advantage of these schools in 
terms of lower free school meal entitlement also amounts to 15-20% of one standard deviation, and it 
is impossible that these differences in background can be a consequence of Faith school attendance.  
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Some of these disparities can be explained by differences in geographical setting, but not all: 
Columns 6-10 report the same regressions once we include home-postcode fixed-effects, and show 
that many differences persist even across pupils who live in the same postcode, but attend different 
types of school. These differences are less marked in terms of ethnicity and languages, but still 
strong in terms of free school meal entitlement and prior attainment. Pupils in Secular-autonomous 
and Faith-autonomous schools still start the Key Stage 2 phase with ks1 scores that are 0.7 to 1.2 
points ahead of Secular-non-autonomous pupils who live in the postcode, and are between 2.5 and 4 
percentage points less likely to be eligible for free meals (on a base of 20 percent). 
5.3. Regression estimates of progress between ks1 and ks2 
Next we turn to regression estimates of the model in equation (1). Results from our first set of 
exercises are shown in Table 4. The dependent variable is the pupil-mean of the Maths and English 
test percentile scores described in Table 2. Column (1) provides information on the raw differences 
between school types (similar to those in Table 2) by regressing ks2 test scores on school-type 
dummies (and academic year dummies).  
In Column (2) we control for ks1 achievement using 183 dummies for combinations of levels in 
Maths, Reading and Writing attainment groups. Adding these controls more than halves the 
differences between mean ks2 scores of pupils attending different types of school. Even then, pupils 
in Faith schools and autonomous schools still appear to do better despite starting from the same ks1 
base. By the time they take their ks2 tests, students in Faith-autonomous schools are nearly 2.5 
percentiles above pupils in non-autonomous Secular schools who were in the same ks1 achievement 
group12. 
                                                 
12
 Note that we have tried other specifications of the value-added model. A common alternative approach assumes that 
( ' )it j i iks x tβ γ ε= + + , so that 2 1 'i i j i iks ks xβ γ ε− = + + , in which case we can just regress the difference between 
pupil’s ks2 and ks1 point scores on school type dummies and other background characteristics. The results from this 
exercise convey a similar message to that in Table 4. They are available upon request. 
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Column (3) introduces the school and pupil level controls detailed in Appendix Table A1 
alongside home-postcode fixed-effects to control for unobserved family/pupil background effects 
that are common to close neighbours. The gap between Secular-non-autonomous schools and other 
school types closes.13 We now find no evidence of an advantage for pupils in non-autonomous Faith 
schools over Secular schools. However, pupils emerge with a slightly higher ks2 scores from 
autonomous schools – both Faith and Secular – than they do from non-autonomous schools. We 
suspect that this advantage has still in part to do with selection on pupil characteristics that are 
correlated with progress between ks1 and ks2 since the evidence in Table 3 suggests that pupils 
attending different school types from the same postcode are still not balanced on observables. 
However, we cannot rule out real academic advantages from the more autonomous governance 
structures of Faith-autonomous (Voluntary-Aided) and Secular-autonomous (Foundation) schools. 
We next estimate equation (1) allowing for secondary-school-type × home-postcode fixed-
effects (Column (4)) or secondary-school × home-postcode fixed-effects (Column (5)), following the 
strategy described in Section 4.3. The results in both specifications reveal a very small residual gap 
between pupils emerging from autonomous primaries and those from baseline schools – at around 
0.8-1 percentile of the pupil distribution or 0.02-0.04 of the standard deviation in test scores. A 
striking finding emerging from the results so far is that Faith affiliation is not, in itself, an indicator 
of higher educational standards. Faith-autonomous schools have mean attainments that are only 0.15 
percentiles higher than Secular-autonomous schools (in Column (5)), and not significantly so (the F-
test for equality of the two parameters has a p-value of 0.7236). Moreover, pupils from Faith schools 
                                                 
13
 Identification with home-postcode fixed-effects requires multiple school types per postcode, so we restrict the sample 
to postcodes where this condition holds, leaving us with a much smaller sample. Note that we have re-estimated the 
specification of Column (2) on the sample of Column (3) to check that the documented attenuation in the coefficients is 
not attributable to a change in the pupil composition arising from the reduced sample. We found this was not the case. 
For example, the effect of attending a Faith-autonomous school was estimated to be 2.107 (s.e. 0.182) when using the 
specification in Column (2) on the sample of Column (3). 
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seem to do slightly worse than pupils from Secular schools when admissions are not under their 
control14. This indicates that religious character is not, on its own, linked to better school 
performance. 
Note that although the estimated ks2 Faith-primary effect is very modest compared to some of 
the previous findings in the literature, it could still be upward biased by selection into Faith-primary 
schools amongst pupils who live in the same postcode and go on to attend the same secondary 
school: the last five columns of Table 3 suggest that, even conditional on secondary-school × home-
postcode fixed-effects, pupils attending autonomous primary schools are associated with 
educationally advantageous observable characteristics. However, in Section 4.3, we have also 
emphasised that estimates using secondary-type or secondary-school fixed-effects could be 
downward biased by differential selection into secondary schools on the basis of Faith-primary 
attendance or ks1-to-ks2 value added. We therefore next proceed to bound our estimates using the 
strategy described in Section 4.4. 
5.4. Regression estimates on sub-samples of stayers and switchers 
In this section, we implement the strategy described in Section 4.4 that compares estimates for two 
subgroups of pupils, namely: (i) the stayers, who attend the same school type in both the primary and 
secondary phases; and (ii) the switchers, who attend different school types in each of these phases. 
As outlined in Section 4.4, under plausible conditions the stayers’ estimates will provide an upper 
bound, and the switchers’ estimates a lower bound to the causal effect of Faith-primary schooling on 
achievement. However, we also argued that estimates based on the switchers’ group are much more 
likely to be close to the causal Faith-primary effect than those based on the sample of stayers or on 
the population of pupils, since we expect sorting to be much weaker among switchers. To support 
this conjecture, we begin by presenting estimates of the degree of selection into Faith-primary 
                                                 
14
 The null hypothesis that the coefficients for Faith-autonomous schools and Secular-autonomous schools are equal to 
the parameter for Faith-non-autonomous schools is rejected with p-values of 0.000 and 0.037 p-value, respectively. 
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schools based on observable characteristics in the stayers’ and switchers’ groups separately. We then 
go on to estimate the Faith-primary effect on ks2 in these two groups separately. 
Descriptive statistics on school type transitions between primary and secondary phases are 
shown in Appendix Table A2. About 77.5% of pupils in Secular-non-autonomous primary schools 
transits to Secular-non-autonomous secondary schools. Similarly, 54.8% of those attending a 
Secular-autonomous primary transit to a Secular-autonomous school for their secondary education. 
Together, this implies that 54% of our sample stays in the same type of Secular school in both 
phases, with just over half (52%) in Community schools controlled by the Local Education Authority 
(and approximately 66% staying in the Secular sector overall). Looking at Faith-school pupils, more 
than 50% of pupils in Faith-autonomous primary schools (about 10% of our sample) stay within the 
Faith-autonomous sector during secondary education (while only 2% stay in the Faith-non-
autonomous sector in both phases). On the other hand, some 170,000 pupils (18%) switch out of the 
Faith sector at the secondary phase, and around 39,000 (4.2%) switch into it. If our conjectures about 
the relationship between school choice and family background are correct, we would expect to find 
very different estimates of the Faith-autonomous primary school effect amongst these different 
groups, and very different patterns of sorting along observable lines into Faith-autonomous schools. 
Estimates of the degree of observable sorting into Faith-primary schools within the stayers’ and 
switchers’ sub-samples are presented in Table 5. In the top panel, we present the results from 
regressions of individual observable characteristics on school-type dummies and home-postcode 
fixed-effects for the sub-sample of stayers (i.e. pupils in all the diagonal cells of Appendix Table 
A2). This exercise is similar to the one presented in Table 3. Individuals who stay in Faith-
autonomous and Secular-autonomous schools over both phases of education have higher ks1 
achievement than pupils in Secular-non-autonomous schools. They are also less likely to be eligible 
for free school meals and to have special education needs. They are more likely to be of White origin 
and to speak English as their first language. Importantly, the differences are larger for the sub-sample 
of stayers considered here than for the population as a whole (compare with Columns 6 to 10 of 
Table 3). 
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Consider now the sample of switchers (i.e. we exclude from our sample pupils in the diagonal 
cells of the transition matrix of Appendix Table A2). Results about observable sorting within this 
group are presented in the lower panel of Table 5. Although there are still some significant 
differences between pupils attending Faith-autonomous schools and those attending Secular-non-
autonomous schools in the primary phase, these are much lower in magnitude than we found in the 
population (Table 3), or in the stayers’ sample (Table 5, top panel). More generally, the differences 
in background characteristics between Faith-primary and Secular-primary pupils in the switchers’ 
group are much smaller than differences for pupils in the population or the sample of stayers.  
These findings support our conjecture that there is much less sorting into Faith-primary schools 
within the switchers’ group than among the stayers. Under the assumption that the amount of 
selection on observable characteristics is a guide to the amount of selection on unobservables 
(Altonji et al., 2005b), this evidence also supports our argument that stayers and switchers can be 
used to bound the estimates of the Faith-primary effect on achievement at ks2. Moreover, the low 
level of sorting in the switchers’ group relative to the stayers implies that estimates based on the 
former will be much closer to the unbiased causal impact of Faith-primary schooling. 
Our results on the effect of primary school types on ks2 achievement for stayers and switchers 
are presented in Table 6. The regressions use the same specification as in Table 4, Column (3), i.e. 
they are conditional on highly flexible controls for ks1 scores, home-postcode fixed-effects and other 
control variables (see note to the table for details). We focus our discussion on the estimated effect of 
autonomous schools, since we have already shown that it is only in these schools that there appear to 
be significant educational advantages.  
For the sample of stayers, attending Faith-autonomous schools in both phases, we find a ks2 test 
scores advantage of 2.7 percentiles, relative to pupils attending Secular-non-autonomous schools in 
both phases; for Secular-autonomous school pupils this figure is around 2.2 percentiles. These 
estimates are 60-100% higher than those found for the full sample in Table 4. On the other hand, we 
find that the ks2 performance gap of Faith-autonomous schools for the sub-sample of switchers is 
below zero, although not significant. Stated differently, pupils who attended a Faith-autonomous 
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school up to age 11, but move to a Faith non-autonomous or a Secular secondary school, perform no 
better – if not marginally worse – at ks2 than pupils who attend a Secular-non-autonomous primary 
school up to age-11, but go on to attend either an autonomous or a Faith secondary school thereafter. 
A similar pattern emerges when considering the effect of attending a Secular-autonomous primary 
school for the sample of switchers. These findings count against better quality in either Faith-
autonomous or Secular-autonomous schools being the driving factor behind the better test results 
presented earlier: the estimated advantage of Faith- and Secular-autonomous school attendance 
closely tracks the degree of selection on observable characteristics, which makes pupil sorting a more 
plausible explanation for any difference in average pupil performance15. 
We can further see this by considering a few simple descriptive statistics. Consider first the full 
sample of pupils. Looking at Table 3 (Columns (6) to (10)), it can be seen that pupils in Faith-
autonomous schools are about 11-12% of one standard deviation above pupils in Secular-non-
autonomous schools in terms of observable characteristics that are associated to higher ks2 test 
scores (e.g. ks1 test scores and free-meal eligibility). In turn, they have a value-added advantage of 
around 6% of one standard deviation (see Table 4, Column (3)), about half the advantage in terms of 
predetermined observable characteristics. Next, for the sub-sample of stayers, the advantage in terms 
of observable characteristics is up to 20% of one standard deviation (see top panel of Table 5), while 
the advantage in value-added is about 10% (as from Column (1) of Table 6). On the other hand, for 
the sample of switchers, the disadvantage in ks1 attainments and free-meal entitlement (the most 
important drivers of ks2 test scores in our models) is about 2.5% of one-standard deviation (see Panel 
B of Table 5), while the disadvantage in value-added, although insignificant, is about 1% of one-
standard deviation (Column (2) of Table 6). There is clearly a close relationship between selection on 
observables into Faith-autonomous schools and the magnitude of our estimates of their ks2 
                                                 
15
 Incidentally, our evidence does not point to any beneficial impact of attending a Faith primary school for more 
disadvantaged pupils, like those eligible for free school meals. This is at odds with most of the US-based evidence. 
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advantage, which once again suggests that most of the documented effects of Faith-autonomous 
schooling are likely to be driven by pupil sorting and school-side selection. 
5.5. Robustness to varying degrees of selection on unobservables 
To conclude our analysis, we formalize the arguments presented above using a variant of the Altonji 
et al. (2005b) procedure outlined in Section 4 and Appendix B. In particular, we investigate: (a) how 
much positive selection on unobservables we need in order to drive our estimates to zero; and (b) 
how robust our estimates are to the assumption that there is an equal amount of selection on 
observables and unobservables. We study these issues for all our pupils in the sample, and separately 
for stayers and switchers. Note that, for computational feasibility, we use regression specifications in 
which we replace home-postcode fixed-effects with 150 LA dummies, so our baseline estimates are 
higher than the comparable specifications in Table 4 and Table 616. We also consider only pupils 
choosing Faith-autonomous or Secular-non-autonomous schools, since we need a dichotomous 
‘treatment’ variable. Our estimates are presented in Table 7, where ρ  in the column heading shows 
the constraint that we impose on the ‘strength’ of selection on unobservables (see Appendix B for 
details). 
The top panel of the table reports our findings for the full sample of pupils. In the first column 
we present results when we constrain our model to have no selection on unobservables. This estimate 
is used as a benchmark and is comparable to that in Column (3) of Table 4. As soon as we allow for 
some selection on unobservables, the positive effect of attending a Faith-autonomous primary school 
is eroded. For example, with 060.0=ρ , the effect is about 0.6 of a percentile, while it turns 
completely insignificant and very small (0.06 of a percentile) when 080.0=ρ . Importantly, the 
value of 080.0=ρ  also corresponds to the point at which the amount of selection on unobservables 
equals the amount of selection on observables in the full sample. Given the importance of selection 
                                                 
16
 We use a modified version of the two-step treatreg command in Stata 11. We need to exclude the postcode fixed-
effects, because the model requires a probit first-stage and there are too many postcodes for feasible estimation. 
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on observables (note the R-squared’s in Table 4), the value of 080.0=ρ  is arguably an upper limit 
to the amount of selection on unobservables in our setting. If this is the case, then the estimate 
reported in the last column of Table 7 can be interpreted as a lower bound to the effect of attending a 
Faith-autonomous primary school17. On the other hand, we have not controlled as well for other 
aspects of family background here as we did in our main regressions, because it was infeasible to 
include home-postcode fixed-effects. As a result, our findings might still overstate the benefits of 
attending a religious autonomous primary school.  
Next we repeat this analysis for the sample of stayers. Results are presented in Panel B of Table 
7. Once again we find that the estimates of the effect of attending a Faith-autonomous primary school 
are very sensitive to sorting on unobservables. The estimated coefficient becomes statistically 
insignificant as we raise selection on unobservables to 100.0=ρ . Further, when we impose an equal 
amount of selection on observables and unobservables )123.0( =ρ , the estimated Faith-primary 
school effect becomes negative at -0.379, although statistically insignificant.  
Finally, in Panel C of Table 7, we present our findings for the sub-group of switchers. In this 
case, even with extremely small degrees of selection on unobservables )020.0( =ρ  or with equal 
selection on observables and unobservables )019.0( =ρ , our estimate becomes statistically 
insignificant and very close to zero (0.230-0.254 of a percentile). 
All in all, this analysis reveals some patterns that support our previous intuitions and evidence 
about sorting for the sub-samples of switchers and stayers. Firstly, we confirm that the sample of 
stayers is significantly more positively selected into Faith-primary schools than other groups 
)123.0( =ρ . However, an equal amount of selection on observables and unobservables drives our 
estimates of the Faith-primary effect down below zero. This finding squares well with our simple 
                                                 
17
 Obviously, if we forced ρ  to assume negative values, i.e. if we assumed negative selection on unobservables, then we 
would find estimates that lie above those documented in Table 4 and Table 6. However, negative sorting is unlikely in 
England given the structure of the school system and the evidence provided above.  
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account presented above, where we highlighted that the positive gap in achievements at ks2 for 
stayers in Faith-autonomous schools is in fact smaller than the gap in their educationally 
advantageous characteristics. Secondly, and more importantly, for the sub-sample of switchers, we 
find a very small degree of selection into religious schooling )019.0( =ρ  based on observable 
characteristics, which we argue is likely to provide an upper bound to the amount of selection on 
unobservables for this group too. This provides strong support for our claim that we are more likely 
to identify the causal effect of attending a Faith primary school in the absence of selection and 
sorting by focussing on the sample of switchers. To reiterate, in our richest specifications in Column 
2 of Table 6 we find that the effect of Faith-primary schooling for switchers is not statistically 
different from zero. 
One concern over the application of the Altonji et al. (2005b) methodology in our context is the 
use of prior achievements (ks1) in the selection equation. This is because ks1 test scores are very 
highly correlated with ks2 achievements, and so tend to dominate the set of explanatory factors in the 
achievement equation (1). As a robustness check, we replicated our analysis using an alternative 
value-added specification in which we replace the dependent variable with the outcome (ks2 – ks1), 
and exclude ks1 from both the main and selection equations (but otherwise keep the same set of 
controls as in Table 7; see footnote 12 for more details about this alternative specification). Results 
obtained following this approach confirm our previous conclusions: we still find that the sample of 
stayers is more positively selected ( 085.0=ρ ) than the sample of switchers ( 006.0=ρ ), and that 
for both groups of pupils the effect of attending a Faith-autonomous school is no longer positive and 
significant once we impose an equal amount of selection on observables and unobservables. In 
particular, for the group of switchers this effect stands at 0.51 with a standard error of 0.25. 
6. Conclusions 
We have provided a number of estimates of the effect of attending a Faith school in England on 
pupils’ educational progress between ages 7 and 11. Our approach has deliberately avoided 
instrumental variable strategies adopted by previous work in the field, because we do not believe (at 
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least for the English setting) that there are any credible instruments for Faith school attendance that 
are uncorrelated with family background, either directly or through residential sorting. Instead we 
have exploited the fact that we have around one million pupils in our database, which, in conjunction 
with precise details about place of residence, academic record and future school choice, allows us to 
carefully control for factors that influence the propensity to attend Faith schools. 
We make no claim to have put a precise number on the causal impact of Faith school attendance 
and have demonstrated that the magnitude of any difference between Faith school pupils and Secular 
school pupils depends substantially on the way we cut the sample. What then are we to make of these 
results? One thing that seems clear is that, Faith schools – and other schools that have autonomous 
admissions and governance arrangements – tend to admit ‘better’ pupils, and there is no 
unambiguous performance advantage that cannot be attributed purely to pupil-side sorting into these 
schools, or to school-side selection of pupils likely to show the fastest progress. Pupils who attended 
Faith or autonomous schools at primary phase, but not at the secondary phase, do no better in 
primary school than pupils who attend Faith or autonomous schools at the secondary phase, but not 
at the primary phase. The Faith or autonomous-school gap in attainments at primary phase seems 
largely attributable to differences between those pupils who choose to attend such schools at any 
stage in their educational careers, and those who choose never to do so or are excluded from doing so 
by school selection procedures. 
In any case, we find no evidence that Faith affiliation lies behind the test-score advantage 
commonly attributed to Faith schools in England. A generous reading of the results suggests that 
pupils in schools that have more autonomous governance and admissions structures – a set that 
includes Faith schools – do progress marginally faster. A pupil starting in an autonomous school at 
age 7 could expect to be one percentile higher in the distribution of pupil attainments by age 11 than 
a comparable pupil attending a standard Secular-non-autonomous school, even when these two 
pupils live in the same postcode and go on to choose the same secondary school. Our upper bound 
estimates put this figure at 2.7 percentiles.  
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To put this in perspective, we draw on the results in Machin and McNally (2004) that report 
labour market returns to age-10 reading tests, based on the 1970 British Cohort Study18. Their figures 
(reported in their Table 7) indicate that the labour market return to a one percentile move up the 
attainment distribution at age 10 was around 0.0042%, conditional on family background. In other 
words, the labour market impact of these small school quality differences seems very slight. 
Certainly, the cumulative effect over 12 years of compulsory schooling could be more substantial 
than this would suggest, and there may be other impacts from schooling of religious ethos – on 
staying on rates and child wellbeing for example – that are outside the scope of this study. However, 
pupils in Faith schools that are under close Local Authority control do not progress any faster than 
similar pupils in comparable Secular schools. Any performance impact from ‘Faith’ schools in 
England seems to be closely linked to their autonomous governance and admissions arrangements, 
and not to religious character.  
                                                 
18
 The 1970 British Cohort Study follows a cohort of children born in one week in 1970 through to adulthood. The 
reading tests were administered in 1980 when the children were aged 10. 
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Appendix A: Formalising the school selection processes  
6.1. A simple model of selection 
Suppose attainments at Key Stage 2 are determined by the type of school attended (j), unobserved 
family characteristics iη  and a random error term 2iε  as in equation (1) in the main text: 
( )2 2 1 2i j i i i iks x g ksβ γ η ε′= + + + +             (A1) 
Consider two school types, Secular (j = 0) and Faith (j = 1) schools, and denote the primary 
phase by t = 2, and the secondary phase by t = 3. Selection into school type in the primary phase is 
determined family background and preferences iη , with a parameter δ  that takes on positive values: 
( ) ( )2 2Pr 1 Pr 0i ij δη υ= = − >               (A2) 
Where 2iυ  is a finite variance, random shock that is uncorrelated with iη  or 2iε , and affects 
choice over school type. At the secondary stage, we assume that iη  remains the dominant factor 
determining Faith school choice. However, families may also take into account the quality of the 
match between the child and the sector in the primary stage as represented by 2iε , with a low 
realisation of 2iε  inducing families to switch school types. Further, Faith secondary schools may 
engage in covert selection that favours children from the Faith primary sector, which we model as a 
differential ‘switching’ threshold for children from the Faith as opposed to children from the Secular 
sector. These considerations imply the following selection probabilities at the secondary stage: 
)0Pr()0|1Pr( 3223 >−−−=== τυσεδη iiijj           (A3) 
3 2 2 3Pr( 1| 1) Pr( 0)i i ij j δη σε υ τ= = = + − + >  
In these expressions 3iυ  is another shock
19
 uncorrelated with iη  or 2iε , and σ  is a parameter 
representing the strength of (self-) selection on the revealed sector-pupil match. Note that 2iσε  enters 
                                                 
19
 This might include random events such as unforeseen home moves, emerging travel constraints, changes in preferences, 
unexpected changes to school capacity (limiting place availability), or changes to aspects of teaching practices of a given 
sector that are uncorrelated with KS2 achievements (e.g. too much or too little religious education). 
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into the selection equations for Secular primary pupils with the opposite sign to Faith primary pupils, 
because a revealed high quality match (high 2iε ) discourages switching to the Faith sector. Finally, 
τ±  is a selection threshold above which Faith secondary schools admit pupils, with preference for 
Faith primary pupils (threshold τ− ) against Secular primary students (threshold τ ). In reality, in the 
English institutional context, both σ  and τ  are likely to negligible (see discussion in Section 4.3), but 
we introduce them here in order to consider their potential implications. In particular, there is little 
rationale for switching on 2iε  because families cannot observe the counterfactual match in the sector 
they did not attend, and the transition from primary to secondary school involves leaving the school 
that disappointed them in any case. 
OLS estimation of the school-type effect 2jβ  in Equation (A1) is biased, with the bias in the 
estimate of 0212 ββ −  in the population determined by: 
2 2 2 2[ | ] [ | ] 0i i i i i i i iE Eη ε δη υ η ε δη υ µ+ > − + ≤ = >          (A4) 
However, we argue that the Faith-Secular primary school comparison within various secondary 
school groups is informative about the size of this bias, and that some within-group comparisons 
provide less biased estimates. Specifically, the comparisons we consider and the associated biases are:  
• Within Faith secondary schools :- 
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3[ | , ] [ | , ]i i i i i i i i i i i i i iE Eη ε δη υ δη σε τ υ η ε δη υ δη σε τ υ+ > + + > − + ≤ − − >     (A5) 
• Within Secular secondary schools :- 
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3[ | , ] [ | , ]i i i i i i i i i i i i i iE Eη ε δη υ δη σε τ υ η ε δη υ δη σε τ υ+ > + + ≤ − + ≤ − − ≤     (A6) 
• Within-switchers:- 
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3[ | , ] [ | , ]i i i i i i i i i i i i i iE Eη ε δη υ δη σε τ υ η ε δη υ δη σε τ υ+ > + + ≤ − + ≤ − − >     (A7) 
• Within-stayers:- 
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3[ | , ] [ | , ]i i i i i i i i i i i i i iE Eη ε δη υ δη σε τ υ η ε δη υ δη σε τ υ+ > + + > − + ≤ − − ≤     (A8) 
Our main claims regarding the bias in the estimate of the impact of attending a Faith primary 
school for these groups are made on the basis of empirical observations on the degree of sorting along 
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the lines of family background within these groups in conjunction with our knowledge of current 
English educational context. However, it is worth highlighting some theoretical considerations which 
support our claims. 
6.2. Analytical results when σ  and τ  are equal to zero 
Assume first that σ  and τ  are zero – or small relative to the selection on iη . In this case, the bias 
terms in (A5) and (A6) are likely to be less than or equal to the bias in the population (A4), whereas 
(A7) is unbiased and (A8) is upward biased.  
To see this, consider first (A7). Assuming itυ  are random variables with identical distributions, 
the selection process on iη  at both phases is identical in the Faith-Secular group and the Secular-Faith 
group (just in a different order), and the bias in (A7) is zero, i.e.: 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 3| 1, 0 | 0, 1i i i i i iE j j E j jδη δη= = = = =           (A9) 
In contrast, the stayers’ group comparison (A8) yields an upward biased estimate, given that the 
Faith-Faith stayers are those for whom iη  is sufficiently high such that 2i iδη υ> and 3i iδη υ> , 
whereas the Secular-Secular stayers are those for whom iη  is sufficiently low so that both 2i iδη υ≤  
and 3i iδη υ≤ .The within-Faith-secondary and within-Faith-primary biases are harder to determine in 
the general case, but our conjecture is that they will generally be less than the population bias µ  in 
(A4), and this can be shown by simulation.  
For one analytical example, consider the symmetric case when: (i) the probability p>0.5 of 
attending a Faith secondary school, conditional on attending a Faith primary school, equals the 
probability of attending a Secular secondary school, conditional on attending a Secular primary 
school; and (ii) the within-Faith-secondary and within-Faith-primary biases are equal, i.e.: 
[ ] [ ]{ }
[ ] [ ]{ }
2 3 2 3
2 3 2 3
| 1, 1 | 0, 1
| 1, 0 | 0, 0
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E j j E j j
E j j E j j
δη δη
δη δη
= = − = =
= = = − = =
         (A10) 
In this case: 
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[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]{ }
( ) [ ] [ ]{ }
2 2
2 3 2 3
2 3 2 3
| 1 | 0
| 1, 1 | 0, 0
1 | 1, 0 | 0, 1
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E j E j
p E j j E j j
p E j j E j j
δη δη
δη δη
δη δη
= − =
= = = − = =
+ − = = − = =
        (A11) 
Note also that, given (A9): 
[ ] [ ]{ }
[ ] [ ]{ }
[ ] [ ]{ }
2 3 2 3
2 3 2 3
2 3 2 3
| 1, 1 | 0, 0
| 1, 1 | 0, 1
| 1, 0 | 0, 0
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E j j E j j
E j j E j j
E j j E j j
δη δη
δη δη
δη δη
= = − = =
= = = − = =
+ = = − = =
         (A12) 
From (A11) and (A12), and using (A4), (A9) and (A10) it follows that the within-Secular-
secondary bias and the within-Faith-secondary bias are equal to: 
[ ] [ ]{ }
[ ] [ ]{ }
2 3 2 3
2 3 2 3
| 1, 0 | 0, 0
| 1, 1 | 0, 1
2
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E j j E j j
E j j E j j
p
δη δη
µδη δη
= = − = = =
= = − = = =
         (A13) 
Given the assumption p>0.5, the within-secondary bias is less than that in the population (A4). 
Further insights can be gained by looking at the effects of truncating the distributions of iδη  for 
pupils originating in Faith primaries, ( )2| 1i if jδη = , and in Secular primaries, ( )2| 0i if jδη = , 
assuming these distributions are of similar shape and variance, but mean-shifted with 
[ ] [ ]2 2| 1 | 0 0i i i iE j E jδη δη µ= − = = > . For simplicity of notation, assume that [ ]2| 0 0i iE jδη = =  
and consider that for any realisation of 3iυ  we have:  
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 3| 1, | 0,i i i i i i i iE j E jδη δη υ µ δη δη υ µ= > = + = > −        (A14) 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 3| 1, | 0,i i i i i i i iE j E jδη δη υ µ δη δη υ µ= ≤ = + = ≤ −        (A15) 
Therefore, for given 3iυ , the biases are as follows: 
• Within-Faith-secondary :- 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 30 | 0, | 0,i i i i i i i iE j E jµ δη δη υ µ δη δη υ µ≤ + = > − − = > ≤       (A16) 
• Within-Secular-secondary :- 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 30 | 0, | 0,i i i i i i i iE j E jµ δη δη υ µ δη δη υ µ≤ + = ≤ − − = ≤ ≤      (A17) 
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• Within-switchers :- 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 3| 0, | 0, 0i i i i i i i iE j E jµ δη δη υ µ δη δη υ+ = ≤ − − = > <       (A18) 
• Within-stayers :- 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 3| 0, | 0,i i i i i i i iE j E jµ δη δη υ µ δη δη υ µ+ = > − − = ≤ >       (A19) 
Note that (A16) and (A17) follow because the difference between the second two terms is less 
than zero, but greater than µ− . Also, (A18) holds because the difference between the second two 
terms is less than µ− , and (A19) holds because the difference between the second two terms is 
greater than zero. 
The assumption that the distributions ( ) ( )2 2| 1 , | 0i i i if j f jδη δη= =  differ only in their means 
follows from (A2) (assuming [ ]2 0iE υ = ). However, in our empirical work, only 30% of pupils are 
enrolled in the Faith primary sector so it might be argued that the two distributions differ in their 
variance, with [ ] [ ]2 2| 0 | 1i i i iVar j Var jδη δη= > = . This difference in variance reduces the bias 
implied by (A16) and increases the bias implied by (A17). Assuming for simplicity that 0µ = , then: 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 3| 1, | 0, 0i i i i i i i iE j E jδη δη υ δη δη υ= > − = > <   if [ ] [ ]2 2| 0 | 1i i i iVar j Var jδη δη= > =
  
 (A20) 
[ ] [ ]2 3 2 3| 1, | 0, 0i i i i i i i iE j E jδη δη υ δη δη υ= ≤ − = ≤ >   if [ ] [ ]2 2| 0 | 1i i i iVar j Var jδη δη= > =     (A21) 
Clearly there is no way to determine the precise outcome of the within-secondary-school 
comparison without making specific distributional assumptions, although under the hypothesis 
specified here above, the potential biases in the within-Faith (A20) and within-Secular (A21) 
comparisons tend to cancel out. 
On the other hand, even with [ ] [ ]2 2| 0 | 1i i i iVar j Var jδη δη= > = , the switchers’ comparison in 
(A18) remains downward biased (for given 3iυ ) because [ ]2 3| 0,i i i iE jδη δη υ= >  increases with 
[ ]2| 0i iVar jδη =
 
and [ ]2 3| 1,i i i iE jδη δη υ µ= ≤ −  decreases with [ ]2| 1i iVar jδη = . Similarly, the 
upward bias in the stayers’ comparison (A19) also holds because [ ]2 3| 0,i i i iE jδη δη υ= ≤  decreases 
with [ ]2| 0i iVar jδη =  and [ ]2 3| 1,i i i iE jδη δη υ µ= > −  increases with [ ]2| 1i iVar jδη = .  
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As it turns out, comparing the Faith-primary and Secular-primary sectors, we find similar 
standard deviations of the ks2 test scores in the two school types (s.d.=26.17 and 26.66, respectively). 
Similarly, we find negligible differences across the two groups when we look at ks2 predictions based 
on a regression of test scores on pupil and family characteristics (s.d.=21.01 and 21.26), as well as 
when focussing on the residuals from this regression (s.d.= 15.80 and 16.10). This suggests that the 
equal variance assumption that underlies the expressions for the biases in (A16) to (A19) may be quite 
reasonable in practice. 
6.3. Analytical results with σ  and τ  different from zero 
Note however that if σ  and τ  are non-zero, the bias from the within-secondary-school-type 
comparisons (A5) and (A6) could be larger or smaller than the bias from the Faith-Secular primary 
school comparison in the population in (A4). 
To begin with, consider the case when 0σ >
 
(and 0τ = ). The within-Faith-secondary-schools 
estimator now compares very-high iδη /high 2iσε
 
pupils from Faith primaries with mid-range iδη /low 
2iσε  pupils from Secular primaries so the bias is positive. The within-Secular-secondary school 
estimator compares mid-range iδη /low 2iσε  pupils from Faith primaries with very-low iδη /high 2iσε  
from Secular primaries, so the bias is ambiguous. On the other hand, the within-switchers’ estimator 
compares mid-range iδη /low- 2iε  Faith-Secular switchers with mid-range iδη /low- 2iε  Secular-Faith 
switchers, while the within-stayers estimator compares very high iδη /high 2iσε
 
Faith-Faith stayers 
with very low iδη /high 2iε  Secular-Secular stayers. Therefore the within-switchers comparison is still 
less biased, and the within-stayers comparison more biased than the population comparison in (A4). 
Consider finally the case when 0τ >
 
(and 0σ = ). The within-secondary biases implied by (A5) 
and (A6) are attenuated, because 0τ >  implies that Faith primary pupils have relatively low iδη  when 
compared with their Secular primary counterparts in the same secondary school type. However, for 
the within-switchers estimate, the additional truncation from τ  implies a further downward bias, 
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while the within-stayers estimate is further upward biased. This can be seen easily (ignoring 3iυ ) in 
the case when ( ) ( )2 2| 1 , | 0i i i if j f jδη δη= =
 
have similar shapes, but are mean-shifted: 
• Within-switchers :- 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
2 2
2 2
| 1, | 0,
| 0, | 0, 0
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E j E j
E j E j
δη δη τ δη δη τ
µ δη δη τ µ δη δη τ
= ≤ − − = >
= + = ≤ − − − = > <
      (A22) 
• Within-stayers :- 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
2 2
2 2
| 1, | 0,
| 0, | 0,
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E j E j
E j E j
δη δη τ δη δη τ
µ δη δη τ µ δη δη τ µ
= > − − = ≤ =
+ = > − − − = ≤ >
        (A23) 
Where (A22) holds because [ ] [ ]2 2| 0, | 0,i i i i i ij E jδη δη τ µ δη δη τ µ= ≤ − − − = > < − , and (A23) 
holds because the mean of a left truncated distribution can never be less than the mean in the same 
distribution when right truncated. 
In summary, whilst the within-secondary comparison provides ambiguous biases, the direction of 
the biases in the within-switchers and within-stayers comparisons are unambiguous. The comparison 
of Faith-Secular switchers with Secular-Faith switchers is never – under any of these assumptions – 
more upward biased than the estimate based on comparing Faith primary with Secular primary pupils 
in the population, and is under the most likely scenarios either downward biased or unbiased. The 
comparison of Faith-Faith stayers with Secular-Secular stayers instead is always upward biased. These 
arguments underlie our claims that: (i) the stayers’ comparison provides an upper bound to the effect 
of Faith primary schooling; and (ii) that by focussing on the group of switchers, we either estimate a 
lower bound to the causal effect of attending a Faith primary school or a close-to-unbiased estimate of 
this effect. The results in Section 5 suggest the latter is the most likely scenario. 
Of course, if ( ) ( )2 2| 1 , | 0i i i if j f jδη δη= =  have completely different shapes, it will be hard to 
prove anything definite about the biases induced by the within-secondary or the switchers/stayers 
comparisons. However, it is hard to imagine likely scenarios where this outcome could arise given the 
context in which we apply our analysis, and given that the evidence provided in the paper supports the 
assumptions and intuitions discussed here above. 
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Nevertheless, we have carried out various simulations which further convince us that the 
conjectures described above hold under very general scenarios. In Figure A1, we report the findings 
from one of these exercises diagrammatically using simulations of the distributions of 2ii εη +  under 
some of the conditions described above. In the graphs, we assume iη , 2iε , 2iυ and 3iυ  to be normally 
distributed, with 25.0)var()var()var(,1)var( 322 ==== iiii υυεη . The first panel illustrates the case 
where all selection into Faith schools is based on family/pupil background ( 1, 0δ σ τ= = = ). By 
construction, the difference in mean 2ii εη +  between the Faith primary and Secular primary 
distributions is 1.4. However, the difference in mean unobservables 2ii εη +  between the Faith-Faith 
and Secular-Secular stayers is larger than this, while the difference in mean unobsevables between the 
Faith-Secular and Secular-Faith switchers is zero. Next, in the central panel we allow for covert 
selection at the secondary level in favour of Faith primary pupils by setting 0.5τ = . As a 
consequence, the distributions in Faith secondary schooling are shifted leftwards and the distributions 
in Secular schooling are shifted rightwards, such that the switchers’ comparison becomes downward 
biased (mean 2ii εη +  in the Secular-Faith group is above that in the Faith-Secular group) providing a 
lower bound estimate, while the stayers’ comparison remains upward biased. The last panel adds in 
selection by 2iε  by setting 1σ =  (plus the other assumptions as above). This shifts the stayers’ 
distributions rightwards, because students with high 2iε  stay in the same sector, whereas the 
switchers’ distributions shift leftwards. Nevertheless, the stayers’ comparison remains upward biased, 
while the bias in the switchers’ sample is small under reasonable assumptions, and always less than 
that in the population. 
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Figure A1: Diagrammatic illustration of distributions of 2ii εη +  arising from the switching process 
Faith and secular primary pupils in Faith and Secular secondary schools: selection based on family background/preferences only 
 
...plus differential selection into Faith secondary schools in favour of Faith primary pupils 
 
... plus self-selection into secondary type based on primary-type match quality  
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Appendix B: Calibrating selection on unobservables to selection on observables 
In this appendix section we describe our implementation of the Altonji et al. (2005b) methodology. In 
our case, the outcome of interest is a continuous indicator (test scores), rather than a binary variable, 
and we want to investigate: (a) how much positive selection on unobservables we need in order to 
drive our estimates to zero; and (b) how robust our estimates are to the assumption of an equal amount 
of selection on observables and unobservables. Note that this exercise is carried out first on all pupils 
in the sample, and then separately for the groups of stayers and switchers. 
The foundation of this analysis is a Heckman-type selection model of the form:  
2 2 1 2
2 1 1
' ( )
( ' ( ) 0)
i j i i i
ij i i i
ks x g ks
d I x h ks
β γ ξ
λ ϑ
= + + +
= + + >
             (B1) 
In which 2ijd  indicates Faith-primary school attendance at Key Stage 2
20; (.)I is an indicator 
function taking value one if its argument is above zero; and the error terms 2iξ and 1iϑ are jointly 
normally distributed with: 0)E( i2 =ξ , 2i2 )Var( σξ = , 0)E( i1 =ϑ , 1)Var( i1 =ϑ  and ρϑξ =),Corr( 1i2 i . 
The parameter ρ  measures the correlation between unobservables in the Faith school selection 
equation and in the value-added equation. Stated differently, this parameter captures the degree to 
which unobserved family/pupil characteristics iη  in equation (1) (in the main text) influence selection 
into Faith schooling. For both the objectives (a) and (b) here above, we are interested in assessing how 
estimates of 2jβ  change as we restrict the parameter ρ  to different values.  
As shown by Heckman (1979), the model in (B1) can be estimated by maximum likelihood or 
using a two-step method. The two-step method first estimates the probability of attending a Faith 
school ( 2 1)ijd =  parametrically using a probit model 2 1 1Pr( 1| , ) ( ' ( ))ij i i i id x ks x h ksλ= = Φ + , and then 
estimates the following equation: 
                                                 
20
 In the empirical work we restrict attention to attendance at Faith-autonomous primary schools. 
 46 
2 2 1 2
1
1
' ( ) *
ˆˆ( ' ( ))
ˆˆ( ' ( ))
i j i i i i
i i
i
i i
ks x g ks MillsRatio
x h ksMillsRatio
x h ks
β γ θ ς
ϕ λ
λ
= + + + +
+
=
Φ +
         (B2) 
Where 2iς  is a new error term, (.)φ  indicates the normal density distribution, (.)Φ  represents the 
normal cumulative distribution, λˆ  and ˆ(.)h  are estimated using the probit first-stage and σρθ = . The 
parameter ρ  is only parametrically identified without exclusion restrictions on γ  (i.e. non-parametric 
identification requires a valid instrument for selection). However, ρ  can be constrained to predefined 
values in the estimation of system (B2) by imposing a constraint on σρθ =  once an estimate for σ  is 
obtained (and maintained as ρ  changes). We obtain this estimate of σ  from unconstrained version of 
system (B2), where parametric identification is achieved exploiting the non-linearities in the Mills 
ratio. By setting ρ  to different values, we can explore the sensitivity of 2ˆ jβ  to different assumptions 
about the degree of selection on unobservables into Faith schooling and find the value of ρ  that is 
necessary to drive estimates of 2ˆ jβ  to zero. This allows us to answer question (a) spelled out above.  
Additionally, Altonji et al. (2005b) discuss how to use this set-up to identify the value of ρ  
which implies an equal amount of selection on observables and unobservables. They argue that, if a 
large number of observable characteristics are available for the investigation, the extent of selection 
on observables provides an upper bound for the amount selection on unobservables. To see how this 
applies to our case, consider the latent variable 2 1 1* ' ( )ij i i id x h ksλ ϑ= + +  and assume we could run the 
following ‘thought’ regression: 
2 0 1 1 2 2ˆ ˆ* [ ( )]ij i i id x g ksδ δ γ δ ξ′= + + +             (B3) 
In the Altonij et al. (2005b) sense, equal selection on observables and unobservables is obtained 
when 21 δδ = . Note now that in our case, where the outcome is a continuous variable and the term 
2iξ does not have unit variance, we have that: 
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σ
ρ
ξ
ξϑδ
γ
γλδ
==
+
++
=
)(
),(
))(ˆˆ'(
))(ˆˆ'),(ˆˆ'(
2
21
2
1
11
1
i
ii
ii
iijii
Var
Cov
ksgxVar
ksgxkshxCov
           (B4) 
The constraint 21 δδ =  is therefore equivalent to the constraint 1/ δσρ =  or 12δσσρ = . Hence, in 
the estimation of system (B2), ‘selection on observables equals selection on unobservables’ implies 
the following constraint: 
))(ˆˆ'(
))(ˆˆ'),(ˆˆ'(
1
112
ii
iijiiES
ksgxVar
ksgxkshxCov
+
++
=
γ
γλ
σθ           (B5) 
Where the superscript ES denotes ‘equal selection’. Note that we do not estimate ESθ  and all the 
parameters in equation (B1) simultaneously subject to the constraint (B5). Rather we use an iterative 
grid-search numerical method to estimate ESθ  that operates as follows: 
(i) Estimate the first-stage probit model in the two-step Heckman system in (B2). 
(ii) Estimate the second-stage of the Heckman selection model imposing a chosen value of 
*
r
θ θ= . 
(iii) Calculate ˆ
r
ρ = ))(ˆˆ'(
))(ˆˆ'),(ˆˆ'(
ˆ
1
11
ii
iijii
ksgxVar
ksgxkshxCov
+
++
γ
γλ
σ
 from the estimated parameters in steps (i) 
and (ii). 
(iv) Repeat (ii) and (iii) for pre-defined, incrementally different values of *
r
θ . 
(v) Plot the values ˆ
r
ρ  thus obtained against the values of * ˆ
r
θ σ . As already mentioned, an 
estimate of the parameter σ  is obtained from the unconstrained model and assumed 
constant, so changing values of *
r
θ can be mapped into corresponding values for ˆ
r
ρ . 
(vi) Find the point where ˆ
r
ρ = * ˆ
r
θ σ  (i.e. the intersection of the plot in (v) with the 45-degree 
line) within a predefined tolerance (0.0005). This can be achieved by progressively 
decreasing the size of the increments in step (iv). The point where ˆ
r
ρ = * ˆ
r
θ σ  is the point at 
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which the amount of selection on observables is equal to the amount of selection on 
unobservables. 
As discussed in Altonji et al. (2005b), the point at which selection on observables is as sizeable as 
selection on unobservables identifies an upper bound for the amount of selection on unobservables 
that one should expect provided that: (a) a sufficient number of controls can be included in the 
empirical models; (b) these controls can account for a substantial amount of the variation in the 
outcomes (as captured by the R-squared’s of the models); (c) the set of controls is sufficiently broad to 
capture most of the factors that determine the outcomes. It follows that estimates of the impact of 
attending a Faith school where we impose an equal amount of selection on observables and 
unobservables provide a lower bound to what the effect of attending a religious school would be in the 
absence of sorting on unobservables. This helps us establishing how robust our estimates are to the 
‘most conservative’ assumptions about sorting based on unobservables, and answers our question (b) 
set out above. 
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Table 1: Institutional characteristics of primary schools in England 
Type Faith Governors (approximately) Admissions 
authority 
Assets owned 
by 
Employer 
Community Secular Parents >30%, Staff <30%, LEA 
20%, Community 20% 
LEA LEA LEA 
Foundation Mostly Secular, 
some C. of E., 
Parents >30%, Staff <30%, 
Foundation/Partnership <25%, LEA 
<20%, Community 10% 
Governors Foundation or 
Governors  
Governors 
Voluntary 
Aided 
Mostly C. of E. or 
Catholic, some other Faith, 
some Secular 
Foundation >50%, Parents >30%, 
LEA <10%, Staff <30% 
Governors Foundation Governors 
Voluntary 
Controlled 
Mostly C. of E., some 
other Faith, some Secular 
Parents >30%, Staff <30%,  
Foundation <25%, LEA <20%, 
Community 10% 
LEA LEA LEA 
Note: C. of E. means Church of England. 
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Table 2: Ks2 (age-11) achievement by school type; descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Percentage of age-11 pupils 
Average ks2 score, Mathematics and English (percentiles) 50.50 26.61 100% 
Faith (non-autonomous or autonomous) 53.85 26.17 29.21% 
Faith-non-autonomous 52.43 26.46 9.94% 
Faith-autonomous 54.58 25.99 19.27% 
Secular (non-autonomous or autonomous) 49.12   26.66 70.79% 
Secular-non-autonomous 49.00 26.67 68.18% 
Secular-autonomous 52.17 26.78 2.61% 
Autonomous (Faith or Secular) 54.30 26.03 21.88% 
Note: the total number of observations is 929,955. Pupils attending or moving to schools with other religious denominations are dropped from the 
sample; they amount to about 0.6% of the sample (6,387) pupils. Autonomous schools include (Secular and Faith) Foundation and Voluntary Aided 
schools. Non-autonomous schools include Community and Voluntary Controlled schools. 
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Table 3: Ks1 (age-7) achievement and pupil background by primary school type 
 No controls Postcode fixed effects Postcode × Secondary school fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 Age-7 
ks1 
points 
Free 
meal 
eligible 
SEN 
status 
White English 
first 
language 
Age-7 
ks1 
points 
Free 
Meal 
Eligible 
SEN 
status 
White English 
first 
language 
Age-7 
ks1 
points 
Free 
meal 
eligible 
SEN 
status 
White English 
first 
language 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
44.752 
(10.212) 
0.163 
(0.369) 
0.208 
(0.406) 
0.845 
(0.361) 
0.903 
(0.296) 
44.695 
(10.198) 
0.181 
(0.385) 
0.218 
(0.413) 
0.860 
(0.346) 
0.924  
(0.265) 
44.894 
(10.135)     
0.149     
(0.356) 
0.212    
(0.409) 
0.902 
(0.297) 
0.950 
(0.217) 
                
Faith-
autonomous 
1.657 
(0.075) 
-0.046 
(0.003) 
-0.014 
(0.002) 
0.033 
(0.005) 
0.037 
(0.004) 
1.283 
(0.053) 
-0.041 
(0.001) 
-0.013  
(0.002) 
0.024 
(0.002) 
0.034  
(0.002) 
0.231   
(0.076) 
-0.016    
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.002) 
0.016 
(0.002) 
Faith-non-
autonomous 
1.290 
(0.097) 
-0.080 
(0.003) 
-0.014 
(0.003) 
0.074 
(0.006) 
0.061 
(0.005) 
0.133  
(0.078) 
-0.014 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.002) 
0.009  
(0.002) 
-0.089 
(0.093) 
-0.007 
(0.002)  
0.010 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.002) 
Secular-
autonomous 
1.209 
(0.232) 
-0.067 
(0.007) 
-0.022 
(0.006) 
0.036 
(0.014) 
0.029 
(0.012) 
0.691  
(0.150) 
-0.025 
(0.004) 
-0.024 
(0.005) 
0.012 
(0.005) 
0.005  
(0.006) 
0.311 
(0.191) 
-0.018    
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
0.014  
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Secular-non-
autonomous 
44.273 
(0.042) 
0.181 
(0.002) 
0.213 
(0.001) 
0.831 
(0.003) 
0.889 
(0.003) 
44.254 
(0.026) 
0.196 
(0.001) 
0.222 
(0.001) 
0.852 
(0.001) 
0.912  
(0.001) 
44.833 
(0.039) 
0.156 
(0.001) 
0.209 
(0.001) 
0.898 
(0.001) 
0.945 
(0.001) 
Note: The top part of the table shows raw means and standard deviations for all schools. The bottom part shows means for Secular-non-autonomous schools, and mean differences for other school categories with respect to 
Secular-non-autonomous schools. Means and mean differences in the bottom part of the Table are obtained from regressions at the pupil level without controls or controlling for postcode fixed effects; standard errors 
clustered at the schools level. SEN means: Special Educational Needs (with and without statements). Sample size: no controls 929,955; Postcode fixed effects: 281,408; Postcode × Secondary school fixed effects: 101,199. 
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Table 4: School type and mean ks2 (age-11) attainment;  
conditional on initial attainment, background and place of residence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Faith-autonomous 5.582 
(0.212) 
2.338 
(0.158) 
1.686 
(0.126) 
0.962 
(0.148) 
0.817 
(0.168) 
Faith-non-autonomous 3.425 
(0.274) 
0.918 
(0.199) 
0.023 
(0.166) 
-0.147 
(0.174) 
-0.222 
(0.193) 
Secular-autonomous 3.168 
(0.606) 
0.925 
(0.453) 
1.118 
(0.337) 
0.973 
(0.371) 
0.671 
(0.397) 
      
Age-7 attainment No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual and school level controls No No Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode fixed effects No No Yes No No 
Postcode × Secondary school type fixed effects No No No Yes No 
Postcode × Secondary school fixed effects No No No No Yes 
R-squared        0.0073       0.6156       0.7614       0.7742       0.7821 
Schools 14,821 14,821 14,020 13,357 12,089 
Observations 929,955 929,955 281,408 155,085 100,199 
Note: Regressions at the pupil level; standard errors clustered at the primary school level. Baseline: Secular-non-autonomous schools. Controls with 
descriptive statistics are listed in Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 5: ks1 (age-7) achievement and pupil background by primary school type; pupils who stay or switch 
school types across primary and secondary phases 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Age-7 ks1 points Free meal eligible SEN status White English first language 
Panel A: Stayers   
Faith-autonomous 2.233 
(0.071) 
-0.062 
(0.002) 
-0.034 
 (0.003) 
0.031 
(0.003) 
0.037 
(0.002) 
Faith-non-autonomous -1.007 
(0.730) 
0.015 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.028) 
0.035 
(0.017) 
  0.002 
(0.016) 
Secular-autonomous 1.826 
(0.292) 
-0.039 
(0.010) 
-0.091 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
Secular-non-autonomous 43.90 
(0.028) 
0.216 
(0.010) 
0.228 
(0.001) 
0.850  
(0.001) 
0.908 
(0.001) 
   
Panel B: Switchers   
Faith-autonomous -0.268  
(0.111) 
-0.019  
(0.003) 
0.014 
(0.004) 
0.008  
(0.004) 
0.026  
(0.003) 
Faith-non-autonomous -0.576  
(0.131) 
-0.011  
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.005) 
0.011  
(0.004) 
0.016  
(0.003) 
Secular-autonomous 0.171  
(0.264) 
-0.012  
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.011) 
0.006  
(0.009) 
0.017  
(0.009) 
Secular-non-autonomous 45.07 
(0.069) 
0.166  
(0.002) 
0.213 
(0.003) 
0.856  
(0.003) 
0.917  
(0.002) 
Note: Table shows means for Secular-non-autonomous schools, and mean differences for other school categories with respect to Secular-non-
autonomous schools. Means and mean differences are obtained from regressions at the pupil level with postcode fixed effects; standard errors 
clustered at the schools level. SEN means: Special Educational Needs (with and without statements). . Panel A only includes pupils who attend the 
same type of schools in both periods. Panel B excludes pupils who attend the same types of school in both phases. 
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Table 6: School type and mean ks2 (age-11) attainment; stayers and switchers sub-samples 
 (1) (2) 
 Stayers Switchers  
Faith, autonomous 2.672 
(0.183) 
-0.106  
(0.225) 
Faith, non-autonomous 2.036 
(2.050) 
-1.319  
(0.248) 
Secular, autonomous 2.176 
(0.594) 
-1.293 
 (0.513) 
   
Age-7 attainment Yes Yes 
Individual and school level controls Yes Yes 
Postcode fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared                         0.8085                          0.8528 
Schools 10,535 9,956 
Observations 170,931 110,481 
Note: Regressions at the pupil level; standard errors clustered at the primary school level. Baseline: Secular, non-autonomous schools. Column 1 only 
includes pupils who attend the same type of schools in both periods. Column 2 excludes pupils who attend the same types of school in both phases. 
Controls with descriptive statistics are listed in Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis with constrained correlation between selection and treatment equation 
Outcome and 
specification 
ρ=0.00 ρ=0.02 ρ=0.04 ρ=0.06 ρ=0.08 ρ=0.10 ρ=0.12 ρ=0.14 ‘Equal 
selection’ 
Panel A: All pupils 
Faith-
autonomous 
2.273 
(0.151) 
1.720 
(0.151) 
1.167 
(0.151) 
0.614 
(0.151) 
0.060 
(0.151) 
-0.287 
(0.146) 
-0.770 
(0.151) 
-1.323 
(0.151) 
 0.060 
(0.151) 
          
Panel B: Stayers 
Faith-
autonomous 
3.120 
(0.196) 
2.551 
(0.196) 
1.982 
(0.196) 
1.413 
(0.196) 
0.844 
(0.196) 
0.275 
(0.196) 
-0.294 
(0.196) 
-0.863 
(0.196) 
 -0.379 
(0.196) 
          
Panel C: Switchers 
Faith-
autonomous 
0.764 
(0.216) 
0.230 
(0.216) 
-0.303 
(0.216) 
-0.836 
(0.216) 
-1.369 
(0.216) 
-1.903 
(0.216) 
-2.436 
(0.216) 
-2.969 
(0.216) 
 0.254 
(0.216) 
          
Note: All specifications include 183 KS1 dummies and dummies for individual ethnicities, gender, eligibility for FSME, SEN status, English as a first 
language and 150 LA dummies. Regressions estimated using two-step Heckman selection models with constrained correlation between the error 
terms of the treatment and main equations. S.E.s corrected for clustering within Primary schools. ‘Equal selection’ displays estimates where ρ is 
constrained such that the amount of selection on observables equates the amount of selection on unobservables. Specifically, for Row 1 (All pupils), ρ 
= 0.080; for Row 2 (Stayers), ρ = 0.123, and for Row 3 (Switchers), ρ= 0.019 give rise to ‘equal selection’ on observables and unobservables. 
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7. Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table A1: Control variables: descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min,Max 
Pupil Level    
Female 0.496 0.499 0,1 
Native language English  0.902 0.296 0,1 
Native language not available  0.022 0.148 0,1 
Native language not English 0.075 0.263 0,1 
Pupil eligible for free school meals (FSM) 0.163 0.369 0,1 
FSM eligibility status missing 0.022 0.146 0,1 
Pupil with special education needs (SEN) 0.208 0.406 0,1 
SEN status missing 0.022 0.147 0,1 
White ethnicity 0.845 0.361     0,1 
Black Caribbean ethnicity  0.014 0.116 0,1 
Black Other ethnicity 0.016 0.124 0,1 
Indian ethnicity 0.019 0.136  0,1 
Pakistani ethnicity 0.023 0.149 0,1 
Other Asian ethnicity 0.011 0.103 0,1 
Other and mixed ethnicities  0.027 0.161 0,1 
Missing ethnicity 0.046 0.211 0,1 
Academic Year 2001/2002 0.499 0.500 0,1 
    
School Level    
Total number of pupils         315.8 132.5 13,1292 
Pupil/teacher ratio 23.14 3.096 4.3,72.2 
Fraction of pupils eligible for FSM 0.169 0.145 0,0.94 
Fraction of pupils with SEN 0.197 0.095 0,0.79 
Fraction of Whites in school 0.844 0.254 0,1 
Fraction of Caribbean Blacks in school 0.013 0.047   0,0.79 
Fraction of Other Blacks in school 0.016 0.053 0,1 
Fraction of Indians in school 0.019 0.070 0,1 
Fraction of Pakistani in school 0.023 0.095 0,1 
Fraction of Other Asian in school 0.011 0.053 0,1 
Fraction of other and mixed ethnicity in school 0.027  0.051 0,1 
Fraction with missing ethnicity in school 0.047 0.167 0,1 
Ratio of ethnically classified to total pupils in school 0.409 0.431 0,1 
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Appendix Table A2: Transition matrix between primary and secondary phase, by school type 
 Future school (age 12) 
Current school (age 11) Faith,  
autonomous 
Faith,  
non-autonomous 
Secular,  
autonomous 
Secular,  
non-autonomous 
Faith-autonomous 51.2 
(91,774) 
0.8 
(1,526) 
10.8 
(19,408) 
37.2 
(66,497) 
Faith-non-autonomous 6.9 
(6,343) 
2.2 
(2,044) 
18.5 
(17,147) 
72.4 
(66,948) 
Secular-autonomous 5.4 
(1,310) 
0.5 
(122) 
54.8 
(13,295) 
39.3 
(9,531) 
Secular-non-autonomous 5.2 
(32,714) 
0.8 
(4,785) 
16.5 
(104,897) 
77.5 
(491,617) 
Note: The table presents row percentages; total numbers in parentheses.  
 
 
